

3 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

**SUBJECT: DCI Conference with Messrs. McNamara and Vance
on the Organization of the NRO, 27 February 1965**

1. The Director met with the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense at 1400 hours on 27 February in the Secretary of Defense's office. This memorandum is based on his account of this meeting which was communicated to General Carter and Mr. Bross later that afternoon.

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3. After these preliminary discussions Dr. Fubini left and the Secretary of Defense came in. During the course of the ensuing discussions, the following points were established.


a. The DCI (USIB) is responsible for determining the intelligence gathering aspects of flights, i.e., the frequency of flights, the targets, the target patterns, etc. There should be a control office in CIA to establish orbital missions, determine the targets and incorporate these intelligence objectives into the tapes which determine the missions.

b. The launching, inflight control and recovery aspects of the mission should be the responsibility of a launching center under the control of D/NRO. The officer in charge of this center should have the final

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NRO review(s)

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word in all decisions relative to launching, inflight control and recovery, etc. However, an intelligence officer should be present and fully informed of all developments and decisions during the course of an operation. This intelligence officer would have no veto over decisions but would be entitled to require an ex post facto review of any decisions which he considered incompatible with the intelligence mission.

c. The integrity of the line of command must be observed and the D/NRO should not be authorized to "go through the wall." Each agency involved should be tasked with responsibilities allocated by the Executive Committee and then given appropriate latitude in carrying out their tasks. A system for monitoring developments and keeping the D/NRO and other elements of the Government concerned with the NRO informed about developments will have to be worked out.

Mr. Vance later acknowledged that the Director had made this statement but that neither he nor Mr. McNamara had reached any decisions as to how to accommodate the Director's point.

d. It was agreed that competition between two organizations in the development of new systems is desirable and it is not intended or desirable to establish the Air Force as a single instrument for this purpose.

e. Responsibility for the development of a system carries with it responsibility for participation in the ultimate assembly of the system. In discussing systems and specifically the responsibility contemplated for CIA, the term "payload" was used. This term means something more than a camera but certainly less than an entire space system. It does not include boosters, for example. Responsibility for development of a payload implies continued responsibility for the production of the various components which make up a "payload," the delivery of the payload, its assembly as a component of the over-all launching and space unit, and participation as appropriate in the assembly of the payload into the space unit.

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4. After some discussion of the foregoing, Mr. McCone directed that:

a. The organizational chart used by Mr. Vance to explain his understanding of the present organizational arrangement should be obtained through Mr. Vance's office.

b. Two new charts are to be prepared; one of which reflects the current organization as it actually works (according to us), including the identification of projects which for one reason or another have been left off the existing chart, such as  Secondly, a chart should be prepared indicating the organization acceptable to us which would be compatible with the principles enumerated above.

c. A memorandum is to be prepared explaining changes in the organizational chart.

d. The memorandum should at least suggest arrangements appropriate for handling the budget. This may be done by the Department of Defense but funds should be allocated to one or the other of the using agencies in bulk so that they may go ahead with the program for which they are responsible.

5. The Director reported that two subsidiary matters had been discussed. One involved the factors to be considered in deciding whether to turn OXCART over to the Air Force. On balance, the Director had indicated that he favored such a turnover but no commitment was made. The second was that the U-2 operation should be retained in CIA.

6. Mr. Bross retrieved the organizational chart from Mr. Vance on Monday, 1 March. His conversation with Mr. Vance is reported in a separate memorandum for the record (attachment). Mr. Vance substantially confirmed all the points made during the Director's report on his meeting of 27 February.

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JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

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* Dictated, but not read.

